In the past year in Asia, newspapers, magazines, TV and assorted media have been absorbed in the politics of finance: the devaluation of currencies, the machinations of the IMF, the reform of Asian financial institutions. "The Economic Crisis" has become a sound bite for all those in the Asian region. Yet what is disturbing about the crisis is not so much the perceived problems of Asia's economies but how little all this talk makes sense to the average person on the street. For example, many have been experiencing dramatic increases in the prices of basic food stuffs yet they look out over plantations and fields still yielding crops. Others are experiencing unemployment while they continue to see people streaming into air conditioned shopping malls. What then is this beast called "the economic crisis"? For some it seems like a dream made up by governments and big business to pass their mistakes on to the man in the street.

Indeed, when we begin to peer beyond the all-encapsulating lens of economics, we begin to see a deeper crisis going on in Asia. This is what we might call a "crisis of values" which is affecting the vast majority of social institutions, most conspicuously the economic. This "crisis of values" has received some lip service by the media - corruption is being painted as a central factor in the failing economies of Asia. In the countries most heavily hit by "the economic crisis" such as Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, this "crisis of values" has come to the media's attention through political turmoil and change.

However, a more in-depth examination of this larger social corruption has not occurred, and the focus continues to be on structural reform, mostly economic. Deregulation, structural transparency, and the cleaning-up of government have been presented as the mechanistic levers which will tear down insider networks of self interested businessmen and politicians. These ideas are well and fine when connected to a more rigorous re-evaluation of not only the structures of society but the values, norms, and ethics of Asian society. Such a rigorous re-evaluation, however, does not start in Washington D.C. with the ponderings of the IMF. It rather must begin here in Asia with a deep look at the wash of conflicting values which have come to make up modern Asia.

What stands out clearly in Asia today is the ongoing struggle between "traditional" Asian values (pre-modern) and the values of modernity, most of which come from the West. For example, political leaders like Mahathir Mohamad, Lee Kwan Yew, and Suharto have embraced western-style capitalism while perpetuating pre-modern patronal ties and networks under the guise of "Asian values". Civil servants have been reared on modern, western-style educations, yet they misuse government structures to build personal wealth and buffer their social status in their communities. From the leaders of nations to school teachers in rural villages, we are witnessing a descent to the lowest common denominator: the worst aspects of western modernism (individualism, economic greed) are combining with the worst of indigenous Asian values (feudal patronage systems, social prestige over individual merit). What is taking place today in Asia then is not its emergence into the ideal of the modern world, that is the free individual enjoying material prosperity amidst democratic government. Rather we are seeing a tragic warping of this vision: material prosperity exists for a small group of patron elite in government and business circles; feudal cronyism is disguised as representative democracy; and a mass of disempowered citizens are increasingly cut off from their historical and cultural identities by the "clear-cut" of economic "development" and consumerism.

This is what is the deeper "crisis of values" behind "the economic crisis". Asia has reached a crisis in the true sense of the word; that is a "turning point" where this mash of ill-accommodating values must be discarded; where each different Asian society from India to China to Chittagong to Minahasa must re-inhabit its cultural space, critically evaluate it and complement it with the best of modernity. It is perhaps the Dalai Lama, representing a people forced into cultural re-evaluation by exile, who expressed this "crisis" most clearly. He has said that certain aspects of Tibetan culture are not progressive and must be left behind without fetishizing all that is traditional. Yet other aspects are indeed truly progressive. These must be retained and developed if Tibetans are going to successfully move into the 21st century with a distinct but not petrified identity.

Indeed, identity is a central concern in this crisis. With increasing speed, we are seeing a revolution in personal identity in Asia. Identities have typically been based in community roles and personal relationships. They are now increasingly based in the abstractions of religion, state and economy which are woven together into exclusivist and chauvinistic mentalities. Thus many young have become cut off from their community, familial and cross-generation ties as they embrace the global youth culture built on consumerism and individualism. Others, meanwhile, have retreated from the intrusions of modernity into nationalist and religious fundamentalisms which view outsiders as hostile. Both impulses, however flawed, are attempts to incorporate the good of both modernity and pre-modernity. Young people tire of the stifling hierarchies of feudal village life, while fundamentalists cling to traditional personal and communal bonds which provide support in an ever-disempowered and alienating modern world.

These impulses are human and filled with good intention. Yet they miss their target by overcompensating and clinging to these new identities as all encompassing solutions. What we need to work toward is a type of middle way, a "Radical Conservatism". This seeks to unite the best of the traditional and the best of the modern. It might be envisioned as an identity which remains rooted in place (the village, the urban neighborhood, the local church and not the TV, the religion or the state) while nevertheless learns from other races, nationalities, religions, etc. as a student of the world. The strength of Asia's cultural heritage offers great resources to this endeavor.

As we develop such human resources, we need to address social structures. Principally, as we confront "the economic crisis", we must consider the reintegration of economy back into culture. Perhaps the differentiation of these two has provided an important venue for Asia to realize economic prosperity, but this differentiation has gone too far. Cultural/ethical values and economics have become alienated from one another. When economies are more locally structured (e.g. people produce and consume their own basic essentials) and organized in expanding and efficient webs (e.g. overseas Chinese business networks), mutual trust, reciprocity and generosity more strongly assert themselves within a base of personal relationships. Such horizontal trade networks further help to weaken the hierarchical ties of patronal relationships, while smaller structures based on personal ties lessen the dependence on legal systems which become alienating and wasteful when overdeveloped.

In sum, this agenda for a "Radical Conservatism" enfolds the personal within the social and the local within the international in a dynamic of individual integrity in the service of the good of the whole. Individuals and communities physically occupy a local cultural tradition while incorporating cultural technologies from other places at their own respective paces. Economies are rooted in self-sufficient community but supported by a global network of human based resources.

In order to enact this agenda, we need a social means which integrates the traditional construct of community (a group of personal bonds and duties based around a specific locale) and the modern construct of civil society (a group of egalitarian horizontal bonds based on mutual interest and commitment and working for a larger good). Amidst "the economic crisis", some of the most compelling "rescue work" is not being performed by the structural readjusters of the IMF or the economic "dream teams" of new governments, but rather the confluence of traditional communities and modern civic groups (principally NGOs). Such people's groups, such as the Forum of the Poor in Thailand, are addressing the actual sufferings of everyday people and helping them to make sense of their lives in this time of crisis, this "turning point".

It would be wonderful indeed if all our media outlets began to focus more closely on these people and groups creating change rather than the economists and politicians who talk of change. If such a viewpoint can be gained by a critical mass of people, then this "crisis" might not appear as a financial disaster but as an opening for change (a true crisis) and a time for hope, faith and good works.

Jonathan Watts is the coordinator of Think Sangha and serves on the INEB Executive Committee.