Introduction

　　　　　　　　 Deciphering the flow of karma in any given situation is certainly not an easy thing to do. For example, is the present situation in Iraq the karmic fate of the Iraqi people? Did they do something bad in the past for which they are now being punished? Are the American struggles there a karmic result of past actions in places like Vietnam? Indeed, the Buddha warned that determining the precise trajectory of karma is one of four things that are unfathomable (acinteyya):

The [precise working out of the] results of karma is an unconjecturable (acinteyya), that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring madness and vexation to anyone who conjectured about it. (Thanissaro, A.iv.77)

However, karma is still a topic he recommended for contemplation:

There are five facts, bhikkhus, which ought to be often contemplated upon by man and woman, layfolk and monk....[The fifth is] 'I am the owner of my actions, heir of my actions, actions are the womb from which I spring, actions are my kin, actions are my refuge'....For what good reason should man or woman, layfolk or monk, often contemplate [this]?....In one who often contemplates on the responsibility of their actions, such evil conduct will either entirely vanish or will be weakened." (Nyanaponika, A.v.57)

The above passages make an important distinction about how to engage with the issue of karma. The former refers to an unresolvable guessing game about what has happened in the past and what will exist in the future. The latter recommends an exercise in awareness designed to affect the present. It is a reflection of personal responsibility, a kind of intentional ethical action.

This distinction between karma as the mysterious trajectory of fate from the past into the future and karma as intentional ethical action remains a very problematic issue for Buddhists. These different understandings of karma imply very different views about how we are to live with each other and in turn how we are to shape our communities and societies – this is true whether or not our understanding of karma is focused on the transcendental nature of the afterlife. The debate over the nature of karma is an extremely old one, but one that remains very relevant for those societies influenced by Indian culture and of course for Buddhist societies, including those expanding rapidly in the West. Since the debate about karma is basically an ethical one about how we are to live with each other, it also has meaning for other societies struggling with similar ethical and social issues. In short, if Buddhists can craft a progressive personal and social ethic that encourages peaceful societies, this may offer a valuable resource for similar endeavors in non-Buddhist societies.

 

What Has Gone Wrong? Karmic Suffering and Injustice

　　　　　　　　 The various essays in this issue present a very concrete view of how karma is understood in the contemporary Buddhist world, especially in Theravada Buddhist societies, and how these understandings have had significant cultural and social ramifications. The dominant and popular understanding of karma presented in these essays is: karma is the result of one's actions from previous lives (somewhat like idea of destiny or fate). Through the law of dependent co-origination (paticca samuppada), our bad or good actions from a previous life create the conditions for a bad or good existence in this life, which consequently influence the path we take towards rebirth in the next life. In this popular understanding, karma acts as a remote and transcendental force. The only ones who can realistically alter its course in this life are monks who can fully practice the way of the Buddha and realize enlightenment by extinguishing all karmic forces. For lay followers, especially women, the ability to practice like a monk is severely limited, and so the lay sangha tends to focus on mostly ritualistic practices by which to gain merit (punya) towards a beneficial rebirth. The ideal rebirth is as a monk who can then attain liberation or nirvana directly. The principal practice for gaining merit is making offerings (dana) in support of the monks' material sustenance. Other important but less emphasized practices are maintaining the five lay precepts (sila) and practicing meditation (bhavana).

　　　　　　　　 Another important aspect of this popular understanding of karma is its highly deterministic nature. This is famously expressed in the Buddha’s words, "As the seed, so the fruit. Whoever does good, receives good. Whoever does bad receives bad" (S.i.227, 328). This passage is understood to mean that whatever action one has done in the past will, without doubt, have consequences in the future. Coupled with the popular belief in rebirth, this deterministic understanding has several important social consequences. First, the causes of one's present suffering lie in the distant past actions of a previous life, and due to the inescapable law of karma, their consequences must be endured. In this way, equanimity (upekkha) as the strength and patience to endure suffering has become an important social value.

　　　　　　　　 This situation is presented in both of the essays from Burma, where Burmans and ethnic minorities alike are taught that their suffering is due more to the transcendental power of samsara than to the immanent power of an oppressive military junta. According to this understanding, the solution lies in cultivating upekkha towards samsara rather than engaging in intentional ethical action to reform the political system. In a short, boxed section on Buddhism and domestic violence, we also see how the teaching of upekkha is used in Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia and South Asia to encourage women to endure violent husbands. In these examples, suffering is seen as a largely personal matter rather than a social one related to various social factors, especially exploitation by others. This personalization of social injustice is explored further in our essays from India, where social inequalities are legitimized as the sacred roles of caste based on inherited karma; and from Thailand, where ostentatious merit making activities legitimize and sanctify the social status of the rich.

　　　　　　　　 In short, a simplistic understanding of karma which says your past actions have completely created your present reality supports a retributive rather than a restorative form of social justice. There can be no negotiation with the complete and inescapable law of karma, and so the economic, political, or gender based suffering that various people experience is their punishment or karmic fate in the grander scheme of samsara. This suffering may be painful and undesirable, but it is inherently just since it is based in a natural law.

This way of understanding karma supports cultural violence. It legitimates an entire religious culture which effectively tells people to be passive and subservient not only to religious authority but to other forms of social authority. This legitimates structural violence; for example, economic disparity - the gap between rich and poor – is depicted as a result of differences in personal karmic fate. This in turn creates conditions for direct violence when governments are seen as legitimate in violently oppressing those who reject their marginalized situation. This edition of WBF Review will not only explore in detail how this cycle of cultural, structural, and direct violence works in various societies, but our writers with their grassroots perspectives will also introduce us to creative ways being used to transform this cycle into one which empowers individuals and restores harmonious societies.

 

The Development of the Teaching of Karma

　　　　　　　　 If we can agree that the Buddha taught about how to end suffering and that his teaching on karma must have been a part of his central concern to end suffering, then his teaching on karma must differ in certain key aspects from the popular one outlined above. So what are the key elements in the Buddha’s teaching of karma? The first step in answering this question is to broaden our view and recognize karma as a pan-Indian concept, an integral part of the world view of most Indian spiritualities, especially Brahmanism/Hinduism and Jainism. In Theravada Buddhist societies, which are the particular focus in this issue, the influence of this larger Indian tradition is significant. It is from not appreciating the differences among these traditions concerning the teaching of karma that Buddhists have become confused about the essential aspects of the Buddha’s teaching on this matter.

　　　　　　　　 The original meaning of the word karma or karman in the earliest Vedic texts is "act, action, performance, business" (Krishan, 1997:4). In the early Vedic period dating before 800 B.C., the term never had the sense of our now common understanding as the moral law of rewards for good and bad action. This early notion of karma as “action” refers specifically to forms of ritual action meant to secure a favorable birth in heaven. Ishtapurta, literally “the fulfillment of that which is desired” (Mahony, 1987:262), is an important related term which means filling up heaven with merit from ritual action (karma) to be enjoyed after death (Krishan, 1997:5). So from the beginning we can see that making merit (punya) is closely connected with the idea of karma. The implication of karma as ritual action to gain heaven was the need for a priestly class to perform such rituals. However, a powerful priestly class (brahmanas or brahmins) and elaborate ritual action were not an original feature of the earliest Vedic religion before 1100 B.C., but emerged in the second period of Vedic development with the Brahmana texts (1100-800 B.C.) (Hiltebeitel, 1987:340). There were a number of ritual practices in this tradition, the most significant being: life cycle rites (samskara), ancestor rites (sraddha), and sacrificial rites (yajna), especially the well known fire sacrifice (agni).

　　　　　　　 The key point about this early Vedic view is that karma was ritualistic and not ethical in character. One’s fate in the afterlife was contingent on karmic actions pertaining to the proper execution of Brahmanic ritual, not to ethical behavior towards other persons. For example, to end up in hell after death meant that one had not properly observed Vedic rituals and taboos, not that one had been a mean or violent person (Obeyesekere, 2002:100). This is not to say that the people of these early Vedic communities were not moral and ethical, but rather that they had not “universalized” their ethical culture. Although such Vedic ritual could be done on behalf of the community, such as a king performing a ritual for the prosperity of the country, the right or power to engage in such ritual action was not inclusive or universal. In Brahmanism, neither women nor members of lower castes could engage in such merit making ritual action, thereby making them dependent on high caste males who were in turn dependent on brahmin priests. When a culture is fully ethicized, the good life in the present or in the afterlife is based on ethical action, that is, the quality of the way we interact with and treat others. Ethical action, as opposed to ritual action, is something not only available to everyone but inherent in the social nature of all living beings. Thus, a culture that is not fully ethicized will deny this ethical agency to certain others, usually women, people of low class, and/or foreigners (Obeyesekere, 2002: 174).

　　　　　　　　 It is not until the beginning of the third Vedic period of the Upanishads (800-500 B.C.) that karma assumes its more common meaning as the moral law of rewards for good and bad action. In this period, we see the influence of the pre-Vedic indigenous Indian tradition of forest asceticism or samana culture. The solitary and introspective culture of the samana shifts the idea of sacrifice (yajna) from a priestly rite (usually involving animal slaughter) recreating the outward conditions of cosmic harmony to an ascetic practice (tapas) to bring one’s inner being into harmony with the outer world. In this mode of thought, karma is no longer linked with merit as a positive means to create a permanent celestial self or soul (atman) as in Brahmanism. Rather, karma is seen in a negative light as the undesirable residue or effect created by action motivated by desire. The Upanishadic tradition understood that karma as “work” or “endeavor” and the merit (punya) gained by such work would eventually perish; from a Buddhist standpoint they are both impermanent (anicca). This meant that any merit created by proper ritual action and resulting in heaven would eventually run out, thrusting the individual back into the world of turmoil and struggle through rebirth. It is here that we can see the emergence of the pan-Indian notions of the cycle of birth and death (samsara), of karma as the actions which determine the course of samsara, and of extinguishing all karma as a means towards liberation from samsara (Hiltebeitel, 1987: 341). In this way, the Upanishadic tradition marks the partial ethicization of the Vedic tradition, because one’s fate in this life and the next depended on the quality of personal action and not on the quality of ritual action. This shift was a significant challenge to the brahmin monopolization of salvation through the idea of karma as ritual action. The Upanishadic yogin was empowered to experience his own personal liberation through his own efforts. In this way, the development of wisdom (jnana) became more important than sacrifice (yajna).

　　　　　　　　 To repeat, however, this ethicization was only partial and not universal in character. This can be seen in the very meaning of the word upanishad, defined as “mystical” or “secret” (Hiltebeitel, 1987:341; Obeyesekere, 2002:112). The Upanishadic seeker of salvation was an ascetic entering into an order of esoteric learning and secret knowledge transmitted from a teacher or guru often in a one-to-one manner. The sacredness and secrecy of this knowledge meant it was not for all to hear, and so we find in the Upanishads various references to taboos against women and members of low castes receiving this knowledge. Thus, although altering one’s karma and gaining liberation from samsara could be experienced personally and directly through ascetic practice, this practice was not universal and open to all persons. Furthermore, the experience of liberation itself was personal and not collective.

The limited ethical scope of the Upanishadic thinkers is in part due to the way karma was understood as an almost material substance, a residue that had to be cleansed from the body and soul. Thus, for the yogi, karma was altered, and ultimately exorcised, through meditation and austere practices. The Jains, who came more directly out of the samana tradition of asceticism, understood karma in an even more materialistic way. The passions, or defilements (kilesa) in Buddhist terminology, endow the soul with the capacity to absorb karma. In this way, even unintentional actions, such as killing small insects while walking along the road, create bad karma and keep the soul bound to the cycle of transmigration and suffering. However, the Jains generally developed more ethical conclusions from this understanding of karma. First, they were the strongest force in articulating and developing the now pan-Indian culture of non-harming (ahimsa) and vegetarianism which led to the end of animal sacrifice (yajna). Furthermore, they attempted to articulate their ascetic tradition in a popular form and create lay communities. This marks another step in ethicization, because it brought the secret truths of the samana and Upanishadic traditions into the public world, which meant everyone could benefit.

The conflict between the old Brahmanic ritualism and the new Upanishadic asceticism was resolved by harmonizing their diverse elements. For example, the idea of karma as a material substance was employed to continue the Brahmanic practice of ancestor rites (sraddha) since karma and merit could be transmitted from one person to another, especially through family bloodlines. Theistic devotionalism (bhakti) is perhaps the best example of the harmonization of these conflicting ideas about karma. It was on the rise at the time of the Buddha (563-483 B.C.), developing most strongly after the fall of the Buddhist Mauryan dynasty in 185 B.C. and reaching its peak with the final maturation of the Bhagavadgita text around 400 A.D. Theism has its origins in the early Vedas, for example in the Rig-Veda Purusha is the primordial being who creates the universe (Hiltebeitel, 1987:342). The Upanishads also often advocate a form of theism, even if it is a formless one such as para-Brahman. Karma as ritual action in Brahmanism depended on having the material resources of a high caste person, while ascetic action in the Upanishadic and samana traditions required arduous training. In theistic devotionalism, however, the way of bhakti-yoga offered a more popular method available to everyone through “the loving surrender to God’s will” and fulfillment of one’s social role. This third trend could be seen as a further ethicization of the tradition in that it opened up salvation to the common person and, at its best, encouraged a more collective salvation through selfless social action.

　　　　　　　　 In these developments, we can begin to see the seeds for the misinterpretation of karma by Buddhists. In Thailand, the situation in which the wealthy legitimize their authority through their ability to buy salvation in gaudy merit making rituals clearly derives from a Brahmanistic understanding of karma. The problem of caste in India is largely traceable to the partial universalization of Brahmanism into theistic devotionalism, specifically with the Dharmasutras (300 B.C.-400 A.D.) in which the castes are said to originate from the body of Purusha and salvation is gained by fulfilling one’s caste role or duty (Mahony, 1987:265). Krishan sums up the Vedic concept of karma as providing "a most rational explanation of the inequalities of life, of affluence and poverty, of happiness and suffering in the lives of individuals....In consequence, the economic and social inequalities and inequities which individuals suffer are not the results of selfish individuals or classes who exploit weaker sections of individuals. They are the products of each man's own karma in previous births" (Krishan, 1997:459). On the other hand, the materialistic understanding of karma in the Upanishads and especially in Jainism, according to which only esoteric knowledge and extreme asceticism can liberate one from past karma, makes salvation for the common person a distant prospect only realizable through numerous rebirths. This implies that suffering in this life must be faced with equanimity (upekkha), which generally means passive resignation in Burma and Thailand. The Buddha saw these pitfalls, however, and directly addressed this issue:

When one falls back on what was done in the past as being essential (pubbekatavada), monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should and shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered and unprotected....When one falls back on creation by a supreme being as being essential (issarakaranavada), monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. (Thanissaro, A.iii.64)

The movement toward a more universalized and ethicized understanding of karma also signals a movement towards a more compassionate, restorative understanding of social justice. Although the Vedic tradition moved away from an exclusivist and less ethical Brahmanistic understanding of karma, that movement was incomplete, because the nature of karma as the moral law of rewards for action remained simplistic and deterministic. In theistic devotionalism, moral duty and ethical behavior are based on the divine word of Vedic texts and the power of a supreme being. In this way, moral law is absolute, unchangeable and non-negotiable. This creates a more absolute sense of moral transgression sharply contrasting sin and righteousness. When sin becomes more absolute, it must be dealt with more severely. Justice is understood as the retributive power of an all-powerful being’s will. However, an understanding of karma which replaces the power of a creator being with the power of karma as a natural law does not necessarily avoid this pitfall. When karma is understood too simplistically as the result of all previous actions, it also become absolute, unchangeable, and non-negotiable. The punishment handed down by a creator God is replaced by the punishment produced through the machine like efficiency of implacable law. The result, as seen above in the Buddha’s words, is a great passivity towards these undeniable forces, and as we will see in this issue, it leaves many “unprotected” against social forces which co-opt these cosmic powers.

 

A Buddhist View of Karma

Karma is an idea that is largely misunderstood....And so we hear over and over again this simple formula: good deeds lead to good results, and bad deeds lead to bad results, and one inevitably must receive the fruits of one's good and bad karma....Buddhists have accepted quite a few things that were being taught way before the Buddha's time. When the Buddha arose, there were a large number of teachings in India already in existence, and the Buddha did not deny them all. There were a number of things that were sufficiently correct for him to accept, at least on some level.　 If something was not complete, he then finished that teaching and perfected it, as he did with the case of karma. The teaching of karma that had been taught up until the Buddha's time was not incorrect.　 It was correct on certain level.　 It was appropriate for the understanding of ordinary people and it led to morality. So in terms of morality and relative truth, it was correct.　 To have a full and complete understanding of karma, however, it was necessary for the Buddha to teach about being beyond karma to the level we call lokuttara, which is to be above the world....If we constantly go along according to karma, if we are constantly under the power of karma, then we are trapped in the prison of karma and there can never be any liberation.　 If the only possibility is to be under karma's power, then there is no such thing as liberation. So this is not the Buddha's teaching.　 The Buddha's teaching is all about liberation. (Buddhadasa, 1988, 37)

 

The Basic Etymology and Construction of Buddhist Karma

Buddhism shares with the other Indian religious systems the basic understanding of karma as "work" or "action." The Vedic concept of karma is qualified as ritual action. The qualifier in the Buddhist understanding of karma is volition or intention (cetana), so that karma is more precisely understood as "action based on intention" or "deeds willfully done" as seen through these words of the Buddha: "Monks! intention (cetana), I say, is karma. Having willed, we create karma, through body, speech, and mind" (Thanissaro, A.iii.415). In this way, it is understood that "actions that are without intention are not considered karma" (Payutto, 1993: 6). This immediately distinguishes Buddhist karma from the Upanishadic and Jain understandings of karma as largely a material force. Buddhism emphasizes karma as fundamentally non-material, mental. As we saw above, the Buddha repudiated past karmic determinism (pubbekatavada) and theistic determinism (issarakaranavada), because they lead to passive resignation and discourage taking action that can be of direct benefit. However, because of this emphasis on the quality of the mind, the Jains considered Buddhists as embracing the view that human action is inconsequential (akriyavadinas) (Macy, 1991:171-72).

　　　　　　　　 Indeed, an extreme interpretation of karma as cetana can lead to a focus on the purification of thought and away from positive active. Such a position can be seen in certain interpretations of Buddhism where monastics should completely withdraw from any kind of social involvement and focus entirely on the purification of their minds through reclusive meditation. When the Buddhist tradition is interpreted this way, it moves towards the ascetic ideal of the Upanishads and the samana tradition, likewise becoming less inclusive, less engaged, and less ethical. However, the Buddha said, “Having willed, we create karma, through body, speech, and mind"; that is, not just through mind. This emphasis on intention should actually be seen as a means to engender skillful, positive activity to resolve karmic formations, which occur most often in the context of relationships with others. If karma is truly a law governing moral and ethical behavior, then it becomes increasingly difficult to speak about it in terms of solitary asceticism, because individuals cannot be moral objects unto themselves. The ground of morality is always established in a community of social relationships (Obeyesekere, 2002:113).

　　　　　　　　 Another key concept in the Buddhist understanding of karma is sankhara, which has been translated in various ways but should be understood here in terms of dependent origination (paticca samuppada) as "volitional formations" (Payutto, 1993:8) or "mental concocting" (Buddhadasa, 1998:28). According to paticca samuppada, any experience that is labeled as positive, negative, or neutral gives rise to desire, creating a karmic result or karmic effect (karma-vipaka) in the form of thought, speech or action. This karma-vipaka then serves as the basis for future experience through the power of sankhara, the power of mental concocting. In the understanding of paticca samuppada spanning three lifetimes, developed in the later Abhidhamma texts, this means that sankhara produced from a previous lifetime will condition experience in this lifetime which leads to the karmic-result (karma-vipaka) of rebirth (jati) in the next life (Buddhadasa, 1992¹). Sankhara expresses itself in the next life as the meritorious (punnabhisankhara) or non-meritorious formations (apunnabhisankhara) which condition the way life is experienced (Payutto, 1994: 28). In the understanding of paticca samuppada which focuses only on this lifetime and is found in the Sutta discourses of the Buddha, jati is not the rebirth of the self in another body. Rather, it is the re-birth of the ego-self over and over again in this life whenever sankhara conditions us to experience the world in an ignorant way thus leading ignorant desire as craving (tanha) and attachment (upadana). The Abhidhammic multiple-lifetime understanding sees sankhara in a more material way as the conditions of future rebirth, while the single-lifetime understanding views it more mentally as the factors which frame consciousness and the way the world is perceived. In either understanding, sankhara is understood as a form of karma; that is the force which plans and organizes the movements of the mind and which through repetition results in character traits, physical features, and repercussions from external forces (Payutto, 1993:7-8).

The understanding of paticca samuppada which focuses on this lifetime is closer to the Buddha’s emphasis on karma as intention, because it makes this whole process observable and changeable in the present life condition. As noted by the Buddha, past life determinism, and consequently the daunting task of dealing with sankhara over multiple lifetimes, can lead to bewilderment and a loss of desire to effect change. Furthermore, in terms of ethicization, an understanding of karma which is less concerned with physical rebirth will tend towards more restorative forms of justice, because karmic action will be much more focused on the potential for change in the present. When the goal of nirvana becomes less remote and more connected to present practice, it becomes more difficult to justify the punishment and suffering of others as inevitable outcomes of the law of karma. Instead, the law of karma becomes an impetus towards intentional action to restore the well being of others.

 

Contextualizing the Law of Karma

In the Abhidhamma literature, the law of karma (karmaniyama) is placed along four other kinds of natural law concerning environment and weather (utuniyama), heredity (bijaniyama), mind and sense (cittaniyama), and the natural interdependence of all things (dhammaniyama). The law of karma is the law which governs human behavior. The highly respected scholar monk Ven. P.A. Payutto says that the importance of these other laws is to emphasize that we must not reduce them entirely to the single law of karma and that "not all events are the workings of karma" (Payutto, 1993:4-5). Payutto further emphasizes that a major problem is the confusion of the law of karma with societal customs and laws, which vary from society to society. What may be impure or evil in one society (for example, eating pork) may not be in another. In this way, karma may or may not work in line with social customs. The common misapplication of it, which we have seen above, is that if one desires to go against social norms (such as eating pork or abandoning a violent husband), one may be threatened with some sort of punishment – in the Buddhist case, the threat of accumulating bad karma. The contextualization of karmic law as one of many laws also steers us away from a deterministic understanding of karma and a retributive sense of justice which reduces suffering to karmic sin. Instead, it moves us towards a deeper investigation of the wide variety of causes behind suffering and the ways to remedy them.

　　　　　　　　 Another over-simplification is equating karma with its results (vipaka), or to put it another way, equating the quality of a person’s mind (their sankhara) with the unfolding of their life. This confusion is connected to the conflation of karma and social custom. Karma can lead to vipaka on a number of levels, such as 1) accumulated mental tendencies and the quality of mind; 2) physical character, mannerisms, and behavior; 3) worldly conditions and the events of life; and 4) larger social conditions. The law of karma is dominant on the first two levels, and then begins to interact with social customs on the third and fourth levels.

When people misapply the karmic formula of "good actions bring good results, bad actions bring bad results," they usually do so on the third and fourth levels. Thus, if a person is born as a poor woman, she must have bad karma resulting from bad actions in a past lifetime, and so must endure the suffering of sexism and classism (the third and fourth levels) regardless of whether is she has a kind and gentle character (first and second levels). On the other hand, if a person is born rich and male, he is seen to be enjoying the good karma of good actions done in a past life and will receive social honors and respect regardless of the quality of his mind and behavior. The great Thai Buddhist reformer, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, clearly refutes this confusion stating, "Karma does not mean fortune or the results, it just means action" (Buddhadasa, 1988:18). In combating the prevalence of this confusion in terms of rebirth, Payutto goes so far as to say, "As for the unfolding of the present life, the results of previous karma stop at birth, and a new beginning is made" (Payutto, 1992:76).

The conflation of karma with vipaka, which leads to a deterministic understanding of karma, is incompatible with the Buddhist understanding of causality. The fundamental teachings of not-self (anatta) and emptiness (sunnata) reject both the ideas of a creator God or an original source like the Self (atta/atman) as well as a purely material universe. In the former case, if there is an all-powerful creator God or immutable original source, power moves in a one-way flow from the Godhead or original source. Power never moves back towards it, making this source unchangeable and unconditionable. In the latter case, causality (the movement of energy or power) is too simplistic, moving in a linear one-to-one correspondence between physical forces and denying any causal role for the mind or spirit (Macy, 1991: 29-30). However, since Buddhist causality is interpenetrative, with things interacting and conditioning each other, power is understood in a much more dynamic and complex way, and cannot be reduced to an unconditionable source or a rigid determinism. Mind and matter, self and other, are intimately interconnected through the non-dual, not-self and empty nature of reality. This means that power surges through all sectors of the intricate web of physical and mental relationships. When the world is seen in this way, the flow of large and complex systems become more varied and less predictable, progressively losing any sense of linear causality (Macy, 1991:168). This is why the Buddha spoke of determining the results of karma as unfathomable (acinteyya) and refused "either to identify the agent of action with the experiencer of the result, or to separate him from it" (Macy, 1991:163):

Monks, for anyone who says, 'In whatever way a person makes karma, that is how it is experienced,' there is no living of the holy life, there is no opportunity for the right ending of suffering. But for anyone who says, 'When karma based on a certain kind of feeling is made, results arise in conformity with that feeling,' there is the living of the holy life, there is the opportunity for the right ending of suffering. There is the case where a trifling evil deed done by a certain individual takes him to hell. There is the case where the very same sort of trifling deed done by another individual is experienced in the here and now, and for the most part barely appears for a moment. (Thanissaro, A.iii.99)

In the non-dual world of not-self and voidness, the structure of our experience (sankhara) is not different from the function of our intentional actions (karma); they are two faces of one being. Karma is not the fate into which we are born into or our inevitable destiny. It is rather our identity and continuity in the present, our resource and our fate (Macy, 1991:165). As the Buddha said, "I am the owner of my actions, heir of my actions, actions are the womb from which I spring, actions are my kin, actions are my refuge" (Nyanaponika, A.v.57).

This is why the understanding of paticca samuppada over three lifetimes appears to contradict the true intent of the Buddha's teaching. It creates an excessive space between action and result which distinguishes sharply between doing good and receiving benefit, when doing good is actually benefit in itself. As the Buddha noted, “Wisdom is purified by morality, and morality is purified by wisdom....and the combination of morality and wisdom is called the highest thing in the world (D.i.124). In the understanding of paticca samuppada within this lifetime, it is clearer that sankhara as the malleable nature of consciousness is impermanent and not-self. The results of previous intentional actions expressed in sankhara are alterable through present intention. As the inevitable consequences of a previous life, sankhara are mysterious and distant. As present mental tendencies, they become an object of change through mindfulness and intentional moral action. In this way, the Buddha constantly exhorted the development of energy and vigor (viriya) until his last words, "All sankhara are of the nature to decay (anicca), strive on untiringly!" (D.ii.156).

　　　　　　　　 This leads us to the conclusion that since karma involves intentional action of a moral nature, it requires ethical behavior in dealing with others. On a personal level, by acting morally we not only create good karmic results (karma-vipaka) in the quality of our mind and behavior (levels 1&2) but also engender positive conditions around us which help to create a positive society (levels 3&4). In this way, the model of an ascetic who shuns society in pursuit of liberation can never represent the epitome of human religious culture. This epitome is rather found in the interdependent struggle of all beings to attain liberation, and so entails a compassionate ethic which cannot passively accept the exploitation of others. If karma is not passive fatalism to past actions or creator Gods, then it is also not acquiescence to unjust social customs or authority figures. Karma as intentional action is ethical and should always follow the five cardinal precepts (pancasila) based on non-harming and non-violence. Payutto sees the practical results of this kind of understanding of karma as a series of empowerments that 1) encourage self-reliance, diligence, and a sense of responsibility; and 2) endow all people with natural and equal rights based on their mental qualities and behavior, rather than on class, gender, or race (Payutto, 1993:99-100).

 

The Retreat of Ethicization

We have seen that the Buddha made a number of key conceptual changes in the understanding of karma that helped to universalize and ethicize it further. His emphasis on intention (cetana) empowers the individual to create action (karma) in the present, instead of being controlled by a priestly class that dictates ritual action, being paralyzed by the weight and power of past karma, or being cowered by the absolute power of a creator deity. The Buddha’s emphasis on not-self (anatta) undercuts tendencies towards unskillful theistic devotionalism, while his emphasis on the unfathomable (acinteyya) nature of karma undercuts tendencies towards reducing karma to an all encompassing explanation for personal and social suffering. Finally, his formulation of morality (sila) into a number of different ethical systems for different types of communities shows the inescapable ethical core of the path towards liberation; for example, the guidelines for a moral king (dhammaraja) in the Cakkavatti Sutta (D.iii.58-79), for the householder in the Sigalovada Sutta (D.iii.180-193), and for republican congresses in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (D.ii.74) which provided the model for the monastic Vinaya.

This concern for interpersonal relationships in Buddhism is what marks the full ethicization and universalization of the Vedic and samana cultures of India (Obeyesekere, 2002: 113). Brahmanism with its emphasis for ancestral rites (sraddha) focused on relationships in the life of the householder, yet remained constrained by its sexism, classism, and the domination of the priestly class. The Buddha often harangued brahmin priests for the emptiness of their Vedic rituals, while he rationalized and ethicized Brahmanistic ritual concepts. For example, in the Kutadanta Sutta (D.i.144-47), the Buddha teaches a wealthy brahmin that the best form of sacrifice (yajna) is not a ritual one involving slaves and animal slaughter, but rather an ethical way of living which provides for people in one's community, supports the monastic Sangha, and practices morality, meditation, and insight to gain enlightenment. Perhaps the best expression of the Buddha’s universal ethical concern is found in his opening the monastic sangha to all seekers, conspicuously women and those of lower caste. And so it would seem that the Buddha would have naturally embraced the Upanishadic view that ritual action to make merit towards a better rebirth is an inferior form of practice unable to lead one to final enlightenment. While this may be true on the highest level of the Buddha’s teaching, the Upanishadic and samana focus on the life of the renunciate was constrained by its exclusiveness and lack of concern for general society. The Buddha created a middle path by harmonizing the two communities into a collective whole. Buddhism, and to a certain extent Jainism, differed from most of the ascetic communities of the time by being concerned for the welfare of householders and by creating a system of reciprocity between the lay and monastic.

This system of reciprocity is based in giving (dana) in which lay people provide monastics with material requisites and monastics offer sermons on the teachings. While this system represents the height of Buddhist ethicization, it also contains pitfalls. Over time it has become formalized and overly ritualistic, reverting into a form of Brahmanism. As such, dana loses its wider ethical meaning as helping anyone in need and becomes a kind of Brahmanistic karma, that is, ritual action designed to gain merit towards a better rebirth. The practice of making merit (punya) in Buddhism remains a very problematic issue. The Buddha recognized the role of merit making often referring to the monastic Sangha as "fields of merit" (punyakkheta); for example, "Such an assembly [of monastics] is….an incomparable field of merit for the world…that a small gift given to it becomes great and a great gift greater" (Anapanasati Sutta, M.iii.80). As we will see in a number of essays in this issue, the contemporary practice of merit making strikes at the center of the ethicization process in Buddhism. The practice of reciprocal dana was an attempt to bring the worlds of lay and monastic together into a harmonious, ethical community focused on the good life and liberation from suffering. However, the punya created from this practice was too easily fetishized into a merit point system for lay persons to gain better rebirth.

Here the influence of the Upanishadic and samana tradition can be seen. When the monastic Sangha became seen as an "incomparable field of merit" and giving material requisites to it the highest form of generosity (dana), the image of the monastic also became fetishized. As one who realizes the deepest and highly personal experiences of enlightenment through assiduous ascetic practice, the monastic, represented in his highest form by the Buddha himself, became a sacred figure and "first among equals" for the lay Sangha. As the ideal of nirvana became centralized in the great ascetic realizations of the Buddha, it became increasingly remote and impractical, even for the common monastic. When this happened, Buddhism began to take on the worst aspects of the Vedic notions of karma, where ritual action is needed to build merit towards a better rebirth in which nirvana can finally be attained. As the essay from Burma shows, lay practice is often about this kind of ritual action which is more "an investment in samsara" than working toward nirvana. As we see in the all the essays, these trends mark a closing down of the universal and ethical character of Buddhism. Now the only ones eligible for nirvana in this life are a small, elite group of male monastics who are able to shut themselves off from the world in pursuit of enlightenment. Meanwhile, the rest of humanity must struggle to get out from under the weight of bad karma accumulated from previous bad lives through performing meritorious rituals.

 

Conclusion

　 　　　　　 The discourses of the Buddha found in the Pali suttas offer a great resource for deepening our understanding of karma. However, these discourses are not without their problematic aspects, as the discussion of merit making shows. Another difficulty we find in the discourses is the Buddha’s focus on the individual level of action. It is typical to find him speaking of how the individual can act ethically towards others in order to prevent harm to them and bring benefit to oneself. In those cases where one is the recipient of harmful action, the Buddha’s teaching is almost always focused on how to maintain and develop wholesome mental states, for example upekkha. The situation that is not well addressed in the Buddha’s discourses, nor anywhere in Buddhist teachings, is how to take the next step of stopping the harmful actions of others and of society. For example, concerning the caste discrimination of brahmins, the Buddha often addressed brahmins directly on this issue, but rarely if ever do we find him instructing those of low caste about how to deal with a direct experience of severe discrimination. This remains an important missing link in the construction of a Buddhist social justice, especially in these post modern times when it is more often social structures rather than individuals that oppress people. Where is the karmic justice for those who purify action, word, and thought yet still suffer from structural violence? As Buddhists, must we once again rely on miserable promises of a better rebirth? This paper has tried to show how individuals can use Buddhist teachings to promote positive intentional action towards improving their lives (karma on levels 1&2). However, essential work still needs to be done to create positive intentional communal action in order to disable harmful social conditions and create beneficial karma-vipaka for society as a whole. The essays which follow are, I believe, a step in that direction.

Notes:
1. In this work, Buddhadasa strongly criticizes the popular understanding of paticca samuppada, derived principally from Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, which he describes as a form of Brahmanism.

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Jonathan Watts is a former staff and executive board member of the International Network of Engaged Buddhist (INEB) and is presently the coordinator for Think Sangha, a socially engaged Buddhist "think tank" affiliated with INEB and the Buddhist Peace Fellowship (BPF), USA.