CONTENTS:
I.
Ontological Distortion? "The Hegemony of Samsara Discourse"
II. Does History Matter Most? "Genealogy of Burmese
Buddhists'
Social Practice"
III. Count Structure as Significant: The
Pitfalls and Potentials
of the Monastic-Lay Relationship
IV.
Paradigm Shift? "The Preciousness of Dullabha
Still, Burmese Buddhist people seem to be sleeping in the "magical gardens", to use Max Weber's term, in which tradition is never questioned. Unfortunately, their sleep is full of misery since they constantly see nightmares in their dreams.
Theravada Buddhism (the way or doctrine of the elders) wins eighty-nine percent of population's heart in Burma. In this tradition, the Buddha is said to have taught that each thought, word and act are karmas that have consequences or fruits (vipaka). In this way, if each idea bears a fruit, the fruit that breeds in Burmese society should be critically examined. The issue of whether there is causation or at least correlation between the predominantly Buddhist society and the consequent "un-Buddhist" experiences remains highly contestable and seemingly unresolved.
As is well-known, the people of Burma bear unspeakable suffering derived from gross human rights violations, kleptocratic corruption, a media blackout and the world's top drug industry. The irony is that if the basic Buddhist teaching of the five precepts (pancasila) - to abstain from killing, stealing, engaging in sexual misconduct, lying, and using intoxicants - were observed, as religious devotees recommend, these afflictions would not have fallen upon Burma. However, the reality proves that Burma's nickname, "The Golden Land", so called because of the glittering pagodas and temples throughout the country, is nothing more than words. The question of why a Buddhist country suffers from such atrocious misery seems to be confusing and bewildering for those who have great passion and faith in the "idea" as a karma and its fruit!
Although Burma is not religiously monolithic, popular Buddhist culture has considerable influence on people's attitudes, behavior and social relationships. Culture is, of course, not the sole determining factor for societal change. But examining Burmese cultural practices and their relation to power in Burma's social and political context can shed more light on the impact of Burmese Buddhism on social change.
I.
Ontological Distortion?
"The Hegemony of Samsara
Discourse"
In Burmese Buddhism, the notion of samsara widely prevails and can be assumed as Burmese ontological understanding. Samsara is a Pali word combining two elements: sam meaning "in succession;" sara meaning "going," "wa ndering." In its ultimate sense, samsara is the operation of dependent origination (paticca samuppada). The continuous arising of consciousness (vinnana), through the sucessive coming together of mental factors (nama) and matter (rupa), is called samsara." In other words, it is a momentary flux of mind and body, of physical and mental phenomena. But very few Buddhists, for the most part only Buddhist monks who practice insight meditation seriously and profoundly, are able to appreciate such a subtle meaning of samsara. In everyday use and popular belief, samsara is mistaken as the material world in which beings live. It is assumed as a round of rebirth or cycle of life and death, stream of existence and transmigration.
Thus, the samsara notion has become the Burmese Buddhist discourse that binds all Buddhist concepts into a neat package. The samsara discourse has been effectively manipulated by political and religious elite with the consent of the people and has given not only a frame of knowledge for understanding the world but also actual practices. Burmese (even non-Buddhists living in Burma, in one way or another,) are very much influenced by this samsara discourse (i.e. cycle of life and death). The realm of samsara is endless, lasting until one attains nibbana (enlightenment).Thus, Burmese people tend to see themselves against the backdrop of samsara. They see themselves as guests in this life. This present life is just a transit point throughout one's long journey of samsara. It is just a brief transient.
Interestingly, when a funeral ceremony is held in Burma, attendees are offered a hand fan, printed with a poem titled "Guest". It says that you are just a guest in this life. You come alone into this world and go back alone. Life is very short. Burmese Buddhism says that humans are travelers in the realm of samsara, the round of rebirth. We all are subjected to impermanence - the phenomenon of just arising and passing away or "coming and going". Nothing lasts. Nothing exists that one can hold permanently. According to this belief, life is no longer for being enjoyed, cherished and celebrated. Burmese in general have a strong tendency to treat not only the sadness and misfortune but also the happiness they encounter as part of life's vicissitudes - the natural process of ups and downs, and coming and going in life.
Thus, every experience (one can include personal crises, human rights violations, social injustice, inequality and what not) happening to them is part of the vicissitudes of life and the impermanent nature of the world. Why should one allow him/herself to get mad about these unfortunate experiences? "Let them go", they tell themselves. People's sensitivity to these normally unbearable and unacceptable experiences becomes blunt. They develop a stoic acceptance of injustice as they train themselves to put up with the bitterness. They have learned to endure the pain and misery of life. They survive but they see no point in resisting. The effect of overemphasizing this philosophy of life is desensitizing and disempowering. People view themselves as objects rather than subjects of change and transformation and come to feel powerless and passive.
Obviously, culture is always determined, at least in part, by power. As particular cultural practices gained hegemony through power, successive rulers and the religious elite in Burma have effectively promoted this samsara discourse. Acts of making merit (punna) in the form of charity (dana), morality (sila) and what not are always appreciated as the investment for one's own samsara. The phrase "investment in samsara" is a literal translation of the one that many monks in Burma use in the merit-making ceremonies of lay devotees. Although people may claim that they are actually making an investment in nirvana by creating the conditions for a beneficial rebirth (i.e. as a monk) through which they may gain nirvana, their intentions are largely confined to the samsara domain, rather than actually transcending it.
This samsara
discourse
is very useful in prolonging the status quo and mystifying and
obscuring the causes of injustice and inequality. Last but not
least, it is helpful in pacifying the anger and the struggle of
the oppressed people. Thus what happens in Burma appears to be
a best case for the ruling powers - overemphasizing the samsara
discourse. People's powerlessness resulting from the exploitative
and distorted interpretation of popular Buddhist belief by the
powers-that-be and the harsh repression seem to be prolonging
authoritarianism. Visibly, Burmese people have grown rather passive
and powerless since the struggle has lingered for many years.
Does
History Matter Most?
The Genealogy of Burmese Buddhists'
Social Practice
Without
adding some
empirical information, the above-mentioned explanation would be
insufficient. The
conceptualization of the people’s mentality and beliefs alone is not
enough to understand
the reality. Treating the ideological explanation as the sole reason
for what
is happening in Burma would be an ahistorical approach and run the risk
of
regarding the ideal as reality. When one looks at Burmese history, one
notices complex
events unfolding that appear to contradict the popular Burmese Buddhist
samsara belief. In
other words,
there seems to be a tension between Burmese Buddhist teachings and
Burma’s
actual political activism. More accurately, religion always remains an
important medium in the formulation of political strategies and
identities in
Burma. No political practice is possible without involving Buddhism –
and
Buddhism has been politicized to such a degree that no religious act is
apolitical.
Pagodas,
as the most visible symbols of religious beneficence, have long played
an
especially important role in reinforcing claims to political power. In
his History
of Burma
(1925), G. E. Harvey noted that the pagodas built by Burma’s King
Bayinnaung in
Ayutthaya (in present-day Thailand) and other neighboring kingdoms "are
still to be seen, and in later ages the Burmese would point to them as
proof of
their claim to rule those countries." This mindset has persisted to
this
day, as seen in the current regime’s building of pagodas modeled after
Rangoon’s renowned Shwedagon Pagoda throughout ethnic minority areas,
as a way
of asserting Burmese (i.e. ethnic Burman) sovereignty over these
ethnically
distinct regions.
Actually, the most illustrative case of Burmese rulers using religion to enhance their political legitimacy is their patronage of the Buddhist monastic Sangha. Successive rulers have exploited the Sangha’s historically important role as a unifying factor for state control. The military regime has formed Sangha organizations in villages, townships, and districts. All monks have to obey the orders of their local organization, whether or not they belong to it. Buddhist monks cannot do anything without the permission of the government. Even traditional religious ceremonies (such as novitiate and ordination ceremonies) need prior permission from the government. Aside from the intimidation and severe repression, the regime tries to control the monastic order by awarding religious titles to leading monks who are loyal to the regime and whom the regime wants to co-opt.
However,
all of the restrictions and repression only reveal how Burmese Buddhist
monks
are defiant against the regime. The number of monks, estimated at
400,000 to
500,000, is about the same size as the army. So it poses not only a
moral
challenge to the military but also an organizational one. Throughout
history,
Burmese monks have been engaged and active in politics opposing the
powers-that-be. Aung San, the Burmese independence hero and father of
Aung San
Suu Kyi, said that monks must desist from taking an active part in
political
life. They must refrain from politicizing. However, the first
organization
established during the independence movement against the British was
the Young
Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), created in 1906 in response to
Christian influence.
It was especially attractive to young Burmans who had been educated
abroad.
They staged an effective “no footwear in the pagodas” campaign against
the
British who wore shoes in the compounds of pagodas.
The
first Burmese monk arrested for his political activism was U Ottama,
who had
lived abroad in India, France, and Japan. He urged people to wear local
clothes
and use local materials. He was arrested twice and imprisoned for a
total of
seven years with hard labor. Another monk who was arrested by the
British
colonial government and died in prison after a 166-day hunger strike
was U
Wisara. Both influenced many Burmese people who previously had not
concerned
themselves with politics. But both were generally viewed as very
politicized.
Some abbots were critical of them for having "Mahayana tendencies"
(i.e. following the bodhisattva model), since engaging in profane
politics is
contrary to mainstream Burmese Buddhism. Actually, both spent time in
India
deepening their international political experience and knowledge by
joining
conferences and activities sponsored by Gandhi’s Congress Party. Both
were influenced
by Gandhi's non-violent disobedience (ahimsa), rather
than by indigenous
Buddhist philosophy.
To make a long story
short, Burmese Buddhist monks have continued this anti-establishment
tendency.
From the beginning of the former socialist government in 1962 until
now, monks
have been at the forefront of massive demonstrations for democracy.
When the
military ruthlessly cracked down on unarmed protesters in August and
September
1988, 600 monks were among the more than 10,000 people killed. On
August 8,
1990, in commemoration of the second anniversary of that democracy
uprising,
more than 7,000 monks and novices walked through the streets of
Mandalay,
solemnly and peacefully accepting alms from the people. Soldiers
confronted the
monks and opened fire, killing two monks and two students while
wounding
seventeen others. One novice disappeared.
Following
this massacre, the Monks' Union (Sangha Sammagi) of
Mandalay, led by
Ven. U Yewata, declared “overturning the bowl" (pattam nikkujjana
kamma) against the
military.
A refusal to accept alms is used as a rebuke to lay people, since
making merit
(punna)
through donations (dana) to the
monastic Sangha is a basic form of lay Buddhist
practice. This powerful religious boycott, which began in Mandalay,
spread like
wildfire across Burma. Throughout the country, monks refused alms from
military
personnel and their families and refused to attend religious services
organized
by the regime. This alarmed and traumatized the ruling junta, because
it struck
at the heart of the samsara discourse by
depriving the junta of the ritual
and cultural means of recreating their power. The military retaliated
by
staging a massive clampdown on the Sangha. More than
350 monasteries were raided
and more than 3,000 monks and novices were arrested. Twenty monasteries
were
seized and expropriated. Several leading monks died in prison.
All
of these historical events surprisingly confirm that the actual
activism of
Burmese Buddhists seems to work against the Burmese philosophical
foundation of
belief in samsara.
A compartmentalization or division between the ideal and the reality is
evident. It appears that Burmese monks engage in societal affairs so
actively
that it contrasts with their daily preaching, which points in a
different
direction.
Count Structure as Significant:
The Pitfalls and Potentials of the Lay-Monastic Relationship
The activism
of Burmese
Buddhists does not come from philosophy, but from the structural role
of
societal leaders, the monks. As a traditional agrarian society, the
majority of
Burmese people live in rural areas. In the village-bound traditional
social
life, the monks and monasteries play the leading role in every aspect
of
people’s daily lives. The villagers support the monks materially as a
way of making
merit (punna),
while monks give their supporters not only spiritual guidance but also
social,
educational, and health-related welfare. Since they want to help their
supporters, whose main concerns are with their daily lives rather than
with
seeking enlightenment, many monks even engage in fortune telling,
astrology,
and providing protective charms and incantations to lay people. These
actions
can be seen as a sort of mutual merit-making by the monks in return for
their
daily necessities. However, the ideal focus in these actions is not the
more
selfish concern of accruing personal merit but the more selfless
concern of
practicing generosity (dana).
The main idea concerning generosity or any of the ten
perfections (parami), of which dana is the first
and foremost, is that there should
be no strings attached. The Buddha urged his followers to give without
any
expectation of personal reward. Basically, the ultimate aim of
generosity
practice is the transformation of the individual from a self-centered,
greed-driven existence to one that is other-centered and greed-free.
The
Venerable Ashin Thittila of Burma explains the benefits of dana thus: "The
object
in giving is to eliminate the craving that lies dormant within oneself;
apart
from which there are the attendant blessings of generosity such as the
joy of
service, the ensuing happiness and consolation, and the alleviation of
suffering."
Giving is literally a practice in letting go, one that increasingly
flies in
the face of the acquisitive tendencies that drive modern society.
Evidence of the importance of charity in Burmese culture is
abundant, from the golden glory of the Shwedagon Pagoda (which owes its
magnificence to the donations of countless devotees) to the familiar
sight of
mendicant monks receiving alms. Nor is charity reserved for those who
choose
the religious life. Rest houses are set up all over the country for the
comfort
of travelers, and vessels of pure, cool water can be found on every
roadside,
put there for the benefit of passersby. These distinctive clay water
pots are
replenished daily, often by local people who have little else to offer,
but who
remain intent upon contributing something to the well-being of others.
"The inclination to charity is very strong" among Burmese, noted
Fielding Hall (1898) in his travels through Burma over 100 years ago.
"The
Burmese give in charity far more in proportion to their wealth than any
other
people."
However, even in societies that are not completely
consumerist in orientation, true generosity faces serious social
pressures. In
Burma these days, many observers take a more jaundiced view of
"charity."
"Everything has gone to pot here," remarked one respected Burmese
writer recently. "You can't paint a rosy picture of so-called Burmese
beauty anymore. Dana has become a
self-serving tool to acquire wealth and
power," complained the octogenarian author, who has written extensively
on
Buddhist literature in Burma. "Even among religious people, dana amounts to
little more
than sending a money-transfer to the next life." This approach to dana and making
merit
denigrates the core thrust of the Buddha's teaching by warping
practices for
present moral and social welfare into essentially selfish ones for
future
recompense.
Dana has been
misinterpreted by successive
reigns and regimes to serve the interests of the ruling elite, who
profess to
promote the values espoused by Buddhism. Under the current military
regime, dana is often
represented as
a panacea for poverty. In its propaganda, the junta stresses that a
lack of
generosity, and not poverty as such, is the real problem facing the
country's
many destitute citizens: "If you say you can’t make donations because
you
lack wealth, you can never expect to become wealthy," reads one typical
pronouncement in a state-run newspaper. This Catch-22 may be cold
comfort for
the poor, but for the regime it makes perfectly good sense. Why blame
decades
of mismanagement for the country's many economic woes, when the
Buddhist
scriptures (according to the junta) say that poverty is simply a
product of
parsimony?
Given the prevalence of such self-serving interpretations of
Buddhist principles in public discourse (which is almost totally
monopolized by
official state opinion), it is not surprising that many Burmese have
strayed from
Buddhism altogether without realizing it. Many who profess to be
Buddhists
often direct their charitable offerings according to the advice of
soothsayers
and astrologers in order to accrue as much merit for themselves as
possible.
Not only is this practice based on misplaced faith in the powers of
pseudo-spiritual fakirs, it also runs contrary to the Buddhist
conception of
charity as an act free of self-interest.
Even more disturbing, from the standpoint of the social
impact of such distortions of Buddhist principles, is the way charity
has
become a form of bribery or even a means of laundering ill-gotten
gains. When businessmen
want to obtain a license or permit of some sort, they invariably make a
donation to a pet project run by one of the ruling generals. For
Burma's drug
lords, who enjoy a status akin to aristocracy in the country's capital,
charity
serves as a convenient way to convert illicit profits into social,
political,
and economic capital. Thus donation ceremonies, which routinely bring
together
generals, drug lords, and businessmen, are highlighted daily on the
state-run
Myanmar TV news programs. Charity funds everything from the restoration
of
pagodas to the national football team, but ultimately, the real
beneficiaries
are those who control the flow of finances behind the scenes.
Most ordinary Burmese are well aware of how the system
works, and remain troubled by it, even after more than a decade of such
abuses.
"Steven Law of Asia World Company has offered a huge donation to build
schools and fund multimedia classrooms," remarked Rangoon schoolteacher
Mya Lwin recently. He added, "We all know where he gets his money from,
but what can we do, except hang our heads in shame?" Law is known to be
one of Burma's leading narco-billionaires.
While some of these practices are distinctly modern
innovations, there is nothing new about Burmese rulers using charity to
enhance
their political legitimacy. The current regime has in many ways modeled
itself
after Burma's pre-colonial kings. This has been most conspicuously the
case in
its patronage of the monastic Sangha. On a daily
basis, the generals make religious
offerings that serve not only as a form of personal merit making, but
also as
powerful symbolic gestures that exploit the Sangha’s
historically
important role as a unifying factor of the state.
The practice of co-opting religious symbolism for political
ends literally reaches its pinnacle with the ceremonial hoisting of the
htidaw (“umbrella”)
on the top
of pagodas that have been newly constructed or renovated. This act is
regarded
as the ultimate merit-making event, and yet it has no basis whatsoever
in
Buddhist doctrine. According to historian Dr. Than Tun, "This practice
began in the 15th century when a Mon king invaded Burman-dominated
territory
and put a big crown made like his own on top of each pagoda in the land
he
conquered." As retaliation, "the Burmese king put a likeness of his
own crown on top each pagoda when he re-seized his land."
In early 1999, Burma's military rulers held a htidaw-hoisting
ceremony to
mark the completion of a major renovation of the country's most sacred
religious edifice, the Shwedagon Pagoda. The ceremony, which was
treated as one
of the most important religious events of the 20th century, culminated
with the
generals shouting "Aung Pyi! Aung Pyi!" ("We won! We
won!"). Far from sharing in the generals’ sense of victory, however,
local
people were left feeling more defeated than ever. "When we heard what
they
were shouting, we felt crushed," recalled one Rangoon shopkeeper. "It
was not act of dana but of
sorcery. I was also frightened by the thought of
this regime remaining in power for years to come," she added.
By far the most appalling misuse of the principle of dana is the
widespread
practice of forcing people throughout the country to "donate" their
labor to public works projects. The regime has repeatedly claimed that
such
"voluntary labor" is carried out in the spirit of dana, as if there
were
something spiritually uplifting about being forced to perform
backbreaking
labor at gunpoint. In some instances, people are genuinely willing to
contribute to the upkeep of temples or to projects that directly
benefit their
communities, but this clearly does not apply to the construction of
roads and
other infrastructure for the tourism industry, for instance. "In some
cases, people do not mind donating their time voluntarily for their
religion," observed recently exiled social critic Tin Maung Than.
"But the donation of labor for temple construction must be separated
from
being ordered to give free labor for government projects," he added.
Some
scholars have pointed out that the current regime is worse than the
pre-colonial monarchy in the way it has conscripted labor. "Even King
Mindon, unlike some of his predecessors, insisted on paying for labor
by his
subjects, and did not require them to attend to court matters while
they were
busy during harvest time," explained anthropologist Gustaaf Houtman,
citing Dr. Than Tun’s The Royal Order of Burma. King
Mindon, who
belonged to Burma's last royal dynasty, eventually abolished corvee
labor
altogether, following the introduction of a coinage currency and a new
taxation
system in 1868, according to Burmese historian Toe Hla.
Political abuses are not the only issue that makes dana problematic
from a
modern perspective. There are also economic consequences that need to
be considered.
Melford Spiro in his study of Buddhism in rural Burmese society (1982),
observed that, "The typical upper Burmese village is reported to spend
from 30 to 40 percent of its net disposable cash income on dana and relative
activities." This may have the positive effect of encouraging hard work
and thrift, but, as Trevor Ling points out in his Buddhism,
Imperialism and
War
(1979), "It is important to note that the money that becomes available
at
harvest time, when the farmer sells his surplus, is channeled into what
are,
from the entrepreneurial point of view, unproductive activities." A
Singapore-based Burmese economist, speaking on condition of anonymity,
concurred,
"Dana
monies may have a very low opportunity cost if the donors do not have
the
skills, knowledge and opportunities to invest them productively." The
tendency to "invest" savings in risk-free religious generosity rather
than in risky capital accumulation has the effect of retarding the rate
of
economic growth, he argued.
Taken to extremes, some might argue that charity as it has
been practiced in Burma for centuries is a hindrance to economic
development,
since it diverts capital away from more "productive" uses. However,
the Singapore-based economist concedes that the problem lies less with
charity
than with the general inefficiency of the Burmese economy: "In this
case,
it is tied up with the problem of a lack of mechanisms, modalities and
motivation for efficient allocation of financial resources." Although
the
profit motive, the driving force behind market-based economics, seems
to be at
odds with the values of Buddhism, it would be a mistake to conclude
that
Buddhism is inimical to economic growth. The Buddha taught his lay
followers
that instead of squandering or hoarding wealth, a quarter of one’s
income
should be used for consumption, a quarter saved for an emergency, and a
half
used for one’s business - a very high rate of reinvestment if taken
literally (Sigalovada
Sutta,
D.iii.188). The experience of other Buddhist countries also attests to
the fact
that Buddhism is no impediment to economic progress. "Thai people also
devote a considerable percentage of their income to merit-making,"
observed anthropologist Christina Fink. "Yet the Thai economy grew at a
rate of more than 10% a year during the late 1980s and throughout most
of the
1990s."
Contrary to the regime’s practice of directing its dana almost
exclusively
towards the Sangha, most learned abbots and Buddhist scholars agree
that there
is no doctrinal basis for such bias. In his book Ottama Purisa
Dipani, the
Venerable Ledi
Sayadaw stated, "Alms giving done for the benefits arising therefrom
after
selecting the status of the donees and the way to accrue most merit is
not a
noble meritorious deed." Citing Ledi Sayadaw's teaching, U Shwe Aung,
one Burma's
most influential Buddhist scholars, wrote: "Giving alms not only to the
Three Gems (the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha) but also to the poor
is the
noblest deed of alms giving." Efforts to assist the poor by providing
such
necessities as food, medicine, and education, initiated by
well-respected
abbots like Thamanya Sayadaw, as well as by Aung San Suu Kyi's National
League
for Democracy and other, smaller volunteer groups, reflect a clear
understanding of the spirit of dana as it is
taught in the Buddhist scriptures.
However, Burmese people seldom make such "secular"
donations, in large part because the requisite institutions of civil
society
are almost entirely absent. Independent civic-minded organizations are
virtually non-existent in Burma today, as any form of popular
participation in
activities affecting whole communities is regarded as a threat to
military
rule. The few "volunteer" organizations that do exist in Burma at
present operate under the auspices of the regime, and often serve
primarily as
means of channeling corporate or private "donations" directly into
the hands of the generals or their cronies.
Beyond
these immediate political circumstances, however, there are also deeper
cultural factors at work that tend to lead to the misapplication of
basic
Buddhist values in Burmese society. An inordinate attachment to
tradition for
tradition’s sake, without a critical awareness of the basis of many
time-honored practices, eventually renders even the best of these
practices meaningless.
The Buddha's teachings on dana remain as
deeply relevant as ever, but only
when they are applied thoughtfully can their true value be properly
appreciated.
The
structural role of the monks as "fields of merit" (punnakhetta) and
reciprocators of
generosity (dana)
seriously determines their intervention in the disastrous situation of
their
supporters. In cities such as Mandalay, where many impoverished Burmese
have
sold their homes to Chinese immigrants and moved to the outskirts of
town,
monks have been left by themselves in the city center with no one to
feed them.
The monks consequentially are very sensitive to the joy as well as the
plight
of the local people. When local people suffer from heavy taxation,
forced
labor, rice quota extortion and relocation, the monks cannot ignore
these
miseries.
For
example, Thamanya Sayadaw U Vinaya, an elderly monk from the Pa-o
ethnic group,
lives at the foot of Thamanya Mountain, some twenty miles outside of
Pa-an, the
capital of Karen State. Apart from his accomplishments as a meditator
and other
imperceptible religious qualities, the Sayadaw is also revered for his
socially
oriented charity practice. The grounds owned by Thamanya Sayadaw cover
a
three-mile radius around the mountain where about 7,000 families live.
The
Sayadaw owns several vehicles, including heavy-duty trucks that are
used for
various construction projects, such as building schools and maintaining
roads
and various public utilities. Aung San Suu Kyi once noted that while
the regime
forces people to contribute labor to build roads, the Sayadaw achieves
his works
through voluntary contributions from the people. However, some
observers have
noted that most people who donate money to the Sayadaw seem to do so in
the
belief that they will earn greater merit due to his exalted spiritual
status,
rather than with an awareness of the social value of their
contributions.
Yet
in this way, monks represent “the public conscience.” The structural
and
historical roles of the Burmese monks and their followers requires them
to be
deeply involved in societal affairs and inevitably in politics. This
appears to
contradict their preaching. And this contradiction or
compartmentalization
produces several disadvantages for Burmese Buddhists, because there is
no
philosophical underpinning, aside from the structural and historical
role of
the religion. One of the clearest cultural impacts is the notorious
mentality
of Burmese people’s short-lived perseverance. The Burmese temperament
is
described with the metaphor of a hay-fire. When you set fire to the
haystack,
it burns quickly and even aggressively, but it extinguishes quickly too. Similarly, when all protests are silenced,
Burmese just sit back and learn to adjust to the status quo. The
passivity,
apathy and even cynicism with politics are increasing, while there is
no
ideological drive pushing them back on track. The Burmese cannot draw
power,
guidance, or energy from their philosophy. In short, Burmese Buddhism’s
worldview
does not operate at a functional level.
IV.
Paradigm Shift?
"The Preciousness of Dullabha"
In fact, there are several counter-hegemonic attempts initiated by some abbots and lay leaders, including U Hpo Hlaing and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to reinterpret some particular teachings of Buddha, such as the ten precepts for the Kings and the seven "conditions which lead to no decline" (aparihaniya) (Mahaparinibbana Sutta, D.ii.73), to reflect modern circumstances and relevancy. However, it is doubtful that their re-interpretations are based on a fundamental paradigm shift.
Actually, a new paradigm could be found within the Theravada Buddhist teaching that can reconcile the reality of today's Burmese Buddhism with its ideal. According to Buddhism, there are five great opportunities which are difficult to obtain or scarce (dullabha). These are: 1. birth as a human being (manussatta-bhava-dullabha), 2. encountering a Buddha (buddhuppada-dullabha), 3. going forth from the life of a layperson and becoming a bhikkhu/bhikkhuni (pabbajita-bhava-dullabha), 4. attaining confidence in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha (saddha-sampattiyo-dullabha), and 5. hearing the true teaching (saddhamma-savanam atidulla-bha) (Chiggala Sutta, S.v.456). Among these five opportunities, birth as a human is most important. Human life is dullabha. It is very difficult to attain. A human life may attain innumerable merits, and is, therefore, regarded as particularly precious. The Buddha did not say that the attaining celestial being is dullabha; instead, he highly valued individual human life. Within Buddhist understanding, human existence is considered more conducive to enlightenment than a divine existence. Thus, every human being holds the preciousness of dullabha life.
If we assumed that everyone had his or her own human value, it would breed significant social implications. If people appreciated their dullabha, they would not allow others to violate and abuse their human dignity, human rights and human value. They would become sensitive to injustice, inequality, and oppression. They would have a strong will to fight back against any attempt to dehumanize them. On the positive side, one would take more responsibility for self-betterment - financially, intellectually and spiritually -- because one appreciates life in its dullabha-defined preciousness. The dullabha notion is, in fact, not the anti-thesis to samsara, but its best compliment for the well-rounded welfare of the people. The notion of dullabha develops a sense of energy and right effort to take advantage of the preciousness of our present existence, as opposed to the passivity and resignation engendered by the eternal power of samsara.
If Burmese Buddhism can
shift its emphasis from the samsara paradigm to dullabha,
the problem of compartmentalization will be also resolved effectively.
By emphasizing the present preciousness of human dullabha,
Burmese can generate infinite sources of power, energy and guidance
to take a more active role in changing their destiny - not only
their political and social destiny but also their spiritual destiny.
This paradigm shift will be harmonious and more in accordance
with the path that the Lord Buddha wanted Buddhists to walk.
References
Ling, T. (1979). Buddhism,
Imperialism and War.
London : G. Allen & Unwin.
Harvey, G.E.
(1925/2000). History of Burma. New Delhi :
Asian Educational Services.
Hall,
H. F. (1898/1995). The Soul of a People,
Bangkok:
Orchid Press
Spiro, Melford (1982) Buddhism and
Society, Berkeley,
CA:
University of
California